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Message-ID: <20060819170834.17845.qmail@web36603.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
Date: Sat, 19 Aug 2006 10:08:34 -0700 (PDT)
From: Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>
To: Crispin Cowan <crispin@...ell.com>
Cc: lkml <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC] [PATCH] file posix capabilities
--- Crispin Cowan <crispin@...ell.com> wrote:
> > At least some of the Linux capabilities lend
> themselves to easy
> > privilege escalation to gaining other capabilities
> or effectively
> > bypassing them.
> >
> Certainly; cap_sys_admin effectively gives you
> ownership of the machine.
> But that is fundamental to the POSIX Capabilities
> model, and not
> something that Serge can change.
In turn it is fundamental to the curious
granularity of privileged operations in Unix.
I maintain that the real value in the POSIX
capability model derives from seperating the
permission to violate policy from the UID.
Granularity of such privilege is a bonus, and
a matter of considerable debate. DGUX ended
up with over 330 distinct capabilities, while
Irix had (last I looked) 24, and Solaris
came in somewhere between. All these systems
work.
Casey Schaufler
casey@...aufler-ca.com
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