[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-Id: <1156418815.3007.89.camel@localhost.localdomain>
Date: Thu, 24 Aug 2006 12:26:55 +0100
From: Alan Cox <alan@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk>
To: Kylene Jo Hall <kjhall@...ibm.com>
Cc: Benjamin LaHaise <bcrl@...ck.org>,
linux-kernel <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
LSM ML <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
Dave Safford <safford@...ibm.com>,
Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ibm.com>, Serge Hallyn <sergeh@...ibm.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/7] SLIM main patch
Ar Mer, 2006-08-23 am 13:35 -0700, ysgrifennodd Kylene Jo Hall:
> Example: The current process is running at the USER level and writing to
> a USER file in /home/user/. The process then attempts to read an
> UNTRUSTED file. The current process will become UNTRUSTED and the read
> allowed to proceed but first write access to all USER files is revoked
> including the ones it has open.
Which really doesn't mean anything in many cases because there are many
ways to get data out of a file handle once you had it opened for write
including sharing via non file handle paths.
You also have to deal with existing mmap() mappings and outstanding I/O.
So here are some ways to break it
SysV shared memory
mmap
or just race it:
Open the USER file
create a new thread
thread #1 create a pipe to a new process ("receiver")
thread #1 fill pipe
thread #1 issue write of buffer that will hold secret data
[blocks after check for rights]
thread #2
wait for thread #1 to block
read secret data into buffer
send signal to "receiver"
receiver now empties the pipe, the write completes and I get the
goodies.
This is why you need a proper implementation of revoke(2) in Linux. You
can't really do it any more easily.
-
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
Powered by blists - more mailing lists