[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <44F859CC.6060404@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 01 Sep 2006 12:03:24 -0400
From: Chris Snook <csnook@...hat.com>
To: Vadim Lobanov <vlobanov@...akeasy.net>
CC: Willy Tarreau <w@....eu>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2.4.33.2] enforce RLIMIT_NOFILE in poll()
Sorry about the blank post last night. Looks like my non-patch-mangling
webmailer has a UTF-8/ASCII conversion bug that eats messages. If
anyone can recommend completely reliable mail clients for posting here,
they'd be a good addition to the lkml.org FAQ
Comments inline...
Vadim Lobanov wrote:
> On Thursday 31 August 2006 20:48, Willy Tarreau wrote:
>
>>Hi Chris,
>>
>>On Thu, Aug 31, 2006 at 09:06:55PM -0400, Chris Snook wrote:
>>
>>>From: Chris Snook <csnook@...hat.com>
>>>
>>>POSIX states that poll() shall fail with EINVAL if nfds > OPEN_MAX. In
>>>this context, POSIX is referring to sysconf(OPEN_MAX), which is the value
>>>of current->rlim[RLIMIT_NOFILE].rlim_cur, not the compile-time constant
>>>which happens to be named OPEN_MAX. The current code will permit polling
>>>up to 1024 file descriptors even if RLIMIT_NOFILE is less than 1024,
>>>which POSIX forbids. The current code also breaks polling greater than
>>>1024 file descriptors if the process has less than 1024 valid
>>>descriptors, even if RLIMIT_NOFILE > 1024. While it is silly to poll
>>>duplicate or invalid file descriptors, POSIX permits this, and it worked
>>>circa 2.4.18, and currently works up to 1024. This patch directly checks
>>>the RLIMIT_NOFILE value, and permits exactly what POSIX suggests, no
>>>more, no less.
>>
>>While I understand that it was a bug before, I fear that it could break
>>existing apps. Are you aware of some apps which do not work as expected
>>because of this bug ? If not, I'd prefer to wait for some feedback from
>>2.6 with this fix before applying it (or maybe you're already using it
>>in RHEL with success ?).
>
>
> I submitted a similar but different patch for this very same issue against the
> 2.6 kernel. It's currently residing in the -mm tree. Andrew Morton is
> somewhat reticent (and understandably so) to push it quickly into the vanilla
> tree; but, for what it's worth, I've yet to hear -- either directly or
> indirectly -- of any application breakages caused by this fix.
Willy and Vadim --
We have received reports of apps which poll a large set of
not-necessarily-valid file descriptors which worked fine under 2.4.18,
when the check was only against NR_OPEN, which is 1024*1024, that fail
under newer kernels. So there is a real motivation to change the
current code. As for the patch breaking existing apps, there are really
3 scenarios:
1) RLIMIT_NOFILE is at the default value of 1024
In this (default) case, the patch changes nothing. Calls with nfds >
1024 fail with EINVAL both before and after the patch, and calls with
nfds <= 1024 pass the check both before and after the patch, since 1024
is the initial value of max_fdset.
2) RLIMIT_NOFILE has been raised above the default
In this case, poll() becomes more permissive, allowing polling up to
RLIMIT_NOFILE file descriptors even if less than 1024 have been opened.
The patch won't introduce new errors here. If an application somehow
depends on poll() failing when it polls with duplicate or invalid file
descriptors, it's already broken, since this is already allowed below
1024, and will also work above 1024 if enough file descriptors have been
open at some point to cause max_fdset to have been increased above nfds.
3) RLIMIT_NOFILE has been lowered below the default
In this case, the system administrator or the user has gone out of
their way to protect the system from inefficient (or malicious)
applications wasting kernel memory. The current code allows polling up
to 1024 file descriptors even if RLIMIT_NOFILE is much lower, which is
not what the user or administrator intended. Well-written applications
which only poll valid, unique file descriptors will never notice the
difference, because they'll hit the limit on open() first. If an
application gets broken because of the patch in this case, then it was
already poorly/maliciously designed, and allowing it to work in the past
was a violation of POSIX and a DoS risk on low-resource systems.
-- Chris
>>Thanks,
>>Willy
>>
>>
>>>Signed-off-by: Chris Snook <csnook@...hat.com>
>>>---
>>>
>>>diff -urNp linux-2.4.33.2-orig/fs/select.c
>>>linux-2.4.33.2-patch/fs/select.c ---
>>>linux-2.4.33.2-orig/fs/select.c 2006-08-22 16:13:54.000000000 -0400 +++
>>>linux-2.4.33.2-patch/fs/select.c 2006-08-31 13:43:39.000000000 -0400 @@
>>>-417,7 +417,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_poll(struct pollfd *
>>> int nchunks, nleft;
>>>
>>> /* Do a sanity check on nfds ... */
>>>- if (nfds > current->files->max_fdset && nfds > OPEN_MAX)
>>>+ if (nfds > current->rlim[RLIMIT_NOFILE].rlim_cur)
>>> return -EINVAL;
>>>
>>> if (timeout) {
>>
>
> -- Vadim Lobanov
-
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
Powered by blists - more mailing lists