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Message-ID: <20060908104550.GA920@elf.ucw.cz>
Date: Fri, 8 Sep 2006 12:45:50 +0200
From: Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>
To: Bernd Eckenfels <be-mail2006@...a.inka.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: patch to make Linux capabilities into something useful (v 0.3.1)
Hi!
> > If attacker already has priviledge foo, he can just go use it. He does
> > not have to exec() poor program not expecting to get priviledge foo,
> > then abusing it.
>
> It is not about attackers. It is about normal usage. If you spawn a program,
> it might behave wrong since it does not know that it is priveledged. For
> example a network daemon might start a child process which interacts with
> the user, and forgets to drop priveldges for it.
Ok, something like that is possible, at least it is not a security
problem.
> > Sanitized here means "all regular capabilities set, all others
> > cleared".
>
> Yes, however I thought this was exactly what the patch is not doing?
Yep, it needs to be fixed ;-).
Pavel
--
(english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek
(cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html
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