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Message-ID: <20060908012201.GA14280@lina.inka.de>
Date: Fri, 8 Sep 2006 03:22:01 +0200
From: Bernd Eckenfels <be-mail2006@...a.inka.de>
To: Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: patch to make Linux capabilities into something useful (v 0.3.1)
On Fri, Sep 08, 2006 at 01:00:28AM +0200, Pavel Machek wrote:
> If attacker already has priviledge foo, he can just go use it. He does
> not have to exec() poor program not expecting to get priviledge foo,
> then abusing it.
It is not about attackers. It is about normal usage. If you spawn a program,
it might behave wrong since it does not know that it is priveledged. For
example a network daemon might start a child process which interacts with
the user, and forgets to drop priveldges for it.
> Sanitized here means "all regular capabilities set, all others
> cleared".
Yes, however I thought this was exactly what the patch is not doing?
Gruss
Bernd
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