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Message-ID: <20060910134257.GC12086@clipper.ens.fr>
Date: Sun, 10 Sep 2006 15:42:57 +0200
From: David Madore <david.madore@....fr>
To: Linux Kernel mailing-list <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
LSM mailing-list <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH 3/4] security: capabilities patch (version 0.4.4), part 3/4: introduce new capabilities
Introduce six new "regular" (=on-by-default) capabilities:
* CAP_REG_FORK, CAP_REG_OPEN, CAP_REG_EXEC allow access to the
fork(), open() and exec() syscalls,
* CAP_REG_SXID allows privilege gain on suid/sgid exec,
* CAP_REG_WRITE controls any write-access to the filesystem,
* CAP_REG_PTRACE allows ptrace().
See <URL: http://www.madore.org/~david/linux/newcaps/ > for more
detailed explanations.
Signed-off-by: David A. Madore <david.madore@....fr>
---
fs/exec.c | 4 ++
include/linux/binfmts.h | 1
include/linux/securebits.h | 4 ++
kernel/capability.c | 2 -
security/commoncap.c | 90 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------
5 files changed, 72 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
index 54135df..e4d0a2c 100644
--- a/fs/exec.c
+++ b/fs/exec.c
@@ -925,10 +925,13 @@ int prepare_binprm(struct linux_binprm *
bprm->e_uid = current->euid;
bprm->e_gid = current->egid;
+ bprm->is_suid = 0;
+ bprm->is_sgid = 0;
if(!(bprm->file->f_vfsmnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)) {
/* Set-uid? */
if (mode & S_ISUID) {
+ bprm->is_suid = 1;
current->personality &= ~PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
bprm->e_uid = inode->i_uid;
}
@@ -940,6 +943,7 @@ int prepare_binprm(struct linux_binprm *
* executable.
*/
if ((mode & (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP)) == (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP)) {
+ bprm->is_sgid = 1;
current->personality &= ~PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
bprm->e_gid = inode->i_gid;
}
diff --git a/include/linux/binfmts.h b/include/linux/binfmts.h
index c1e82c5..c7fb183 100644
--- a/include/linux/binfmts.h
+++ b/include/linux/binfmts.h
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ struct linux_binprm{
struct file * file;
int e_uid, e_gid;
kernel_cap_t cap_inheritable, cap_permitted, cap_effective;
+ char is_suid, is_sgid;
void *security;
int argc, envc;
char * filename; /* Name of binary as seen by procps */
diff --git a/include/linux/securebits.h b/include/linux/securebits.h
index 5b06178..0092332 100644
--- a/include/linux/securebits.h
+++ b/include/linux/securebits.h
@@ -18,6 +18,10 @@ #define SECURE_NOROOT 0
privileges. When unset, setuid doesn't change privileges. */
#define SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP 2
+/* When set, exec()ing a suid/sgid program does not force reinstate
+ all "regular" capabilities. */
+#define SECURE_NO_SXID_SANITIZE 4
+
/* Each securesetting is implemented using two bits. One bit specify
whether the setting is on or off. The other bit specify whether the
setting is fixed or not. A setting which is fixed cannot be changed
diff --git a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c
index 32b2521..2bb802a 100644
--- a/kernel/capability.c
+++ b/kernel/capability.c
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ #include <linux/syscalls.h>
#include <asm/uaccess.h>
unsigned securebits = SECUREBITS_DEFAULT; /* systemwide security settings */
-kernel_cap_t cap_bset = CAP_INIT_EFF_SET;
+kernel_cap_t cap_bset = CAP_INIT_INH_SET;
EXPORT_SYMBOL(securebits);
EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_bset);
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index 91dc53d..291a4bd 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ #include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/securebits.h>
#include <linux/file.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/mman.h>
@@ -97,6 +98,8 @@ int cap_capset_check (struct task_struct
if (!cap_issubset (*effective, *permitted)) {
return -EPERM;
}
+ /* we allow Inheritable not to be a subset of Permitted:
+ * cap_capset_set will intersect them anyway */
return 0;
}
@@ -105,7 +108,7 @@ void cap_capset_set (struct task_struct
kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
{
target->cap_effective = *effective;
- target->cap_inheritable = *inheritable;
+ target->cap_inheritable = cap_intersect (*permitted, *inheritable);
target->cap_permitted = *permitted;
}
@@ -114,39 +117,66 @@ int cap_bprm_set_security (struct linux_
/* Copied from fs/exec.c:prepare_binprm. */
/* We don't have VFS support for capabilities yet */
- cap_clear (bprm->cap_inheritable);
+ cap_set_full (bprm->cap_inheritable);
cap_clear (bprm->cap_permitted);
- cap_clear (bprm->cap_effective);
+ cap_set_full (bprm->cap_effective);
+
+ /* Sanitize caps for all suid/sgid programs. */
+ if (!issecure (SECURE_NO_SXID_SANITIZE) && (bprm->is_suid
+ || bprm->is_sgid)) {
+ /* Ensure that they get _at least_ regular caps. */
+ bprm->cap_permitted = CAP_REGULAR_SET;
+ if ((current->uid != 0 && current->euid != 0
+ && current->suid != 0)
+ || issecure (SECURE_NOROOT)) {
+ /* Ensure that they don't get _more_ caps when they
+ might not expect it. Note that dropping
+ capabilities on change of ?uid from ==0 to !=0 will
+ be handled by cap_task_post_setuid() called from
+ cap_bprm_apply_creds() below. Yuck!!!!!! This is
+ soooooo ugly! */
+ bprm->cap_inheritable = CAP_REGULAR_SET;
+ bprm->cap_effective = CAP_REGULAR_SET;
+ }
+ }
/* To support inheritance of root-permissions and suid-root
* executables under compatibility mode, we raise all three
* capability sets for the file.
- *
- * If only the real uid is 0, we only raise the inheritable
- * and permitted sets of the executable file.
*/
-
if (!issecure (SECURE_NOROOT)) {
- if (bprm->e_uid == 0 || current->uid == 0) {
+ if (bprm->is_suid && bprm->e_uid == 0) {
cap_set_full (bprm->cap_inheritable);
cap_set_full (bprm->cap_permitted);
- }
- if (bprm->e_uid == 0)
cap_set_full (bprm->cap_effective);
+ }
}
+
return 0;
}
void cap_bprm_apply_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe)
{
/* Derived from fs/exec.c:compute_creds. */
- kernel_cap_t new_permitted, working;
+ kernel_cap_t new_permitted, new_effective, working;
+ uid_t old_ruid, old_euid, old_suid;
+ /* P'(per) = (P(inh) & F(inh)) | (F(per) & bset) */
new_permitted = cap_intersect (bprm->cap_permitted, cap_bset);
working = cap_intersect (bprm->cap_inheritable,
current->cap_inheritable);
new_permitted = cap_combine (new_permitted, working);
+ /* P'(eff) = (P(inh) & P(eff) & F(inh)) | (F(per) & F(eff) & bset) */
+ new_effective = cap_intersect (bprm->cap_permitted, bprm->cap_effective);
+ new_effective = cap_intersect (new_effective, cap_bset);
+ working = cap_intersect (bprm->cap_inheritable,
+ current->cap_effective);
+ working = cap_intersect (working, current->cap_inheritable);
+ new_effective = cap_combine (new_effective, working);
+
+ /* P'(inh) = P'(per) */
+
if (bprm->e_uid != current->uid || bprm->e_gid != current->gid ||
!cap_issubset (new_permitted, current->cap_permitted)) {
current->mm->dumpable = suid_dumpable;
@@ -159,36 +189,37 @@ void cap_bprm_apply_creds (struct linux_
if (!capable (CAP_SETPCAP)) {
new_permitted = cap_intersect (new_permitted,
current->cap_permitted);
+ new_effective = cap_intersect (new_permitted,
+ new_effective);
}
}
}
+ old_ruid = current->uid;
+ old_euid = current->euid;
+ old_suid = current->suid;
current->suid = current->euid = current->fsuid = bprm->e_uid;
current->sgid = current->egid = current->fsgid = bprm->e_gid;
- /* For init, we want to retain the capabilities set
- * in the init_task struct. Thus we skip the usual
- * capability rules */
- if (current->pid != 1) {
- current->cap_permitted = new_permitted;
- current->cap_effective =
- cap_intersect (new_permitted, bprm->cap_effective);
- }
-
- /* AUD: Audit candidate if current->cap_effective is set */
+ current->cap_permitted = new_permitted;
+ current->cap_effective = new_effective;
+ current->cap_inheritable = new_permitted;
current->keep_capabilities = 0;
+ /* Make sure we drop capabilities if required by suid. */
+ cap_task_post_setuid (old_ruid, old_euid, old_suid, LSM_SETID_RES);
+
+ /* AUD: Audit candidate if current->cap_effective is set */
}
int cap_bprm_secureexec (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
/* If/when this module is enhanced to incorporate capability
bits on files, the test below should be extended to also perform a
- test between the old and new capability sets. For now,
- it simply preserves the legacy decision algorithm used by
- the old userland. */
- return (current->euid != current->uid ||
- current->egid != current->gid);
+ test between the old and new capability sets. */
+ return ((bprm->is_suid || bprm->is_sgid)
+ && !cap_issubset (bprm->cap_permitted,
+ current->cap_permitted));
}
int cap_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name, void *value,
@@ -253,12 +284,15 @@ static inline void cap_emulate_setxuid (
= cap_intersect (current->cap_effective,
CAP_REGULAR_SET);
}
+ current->cap_inheritable
+ = cap_intersect (current->cap_inheritable,
+ CAP_REGULAR_SET);
}
- if (old_euid == 0 && current->euid != 0) {
+ if (old_euid == 0 && current->euid != 0 && !current->keep_capabilities) {
current->cap_effective = cap_intersect (current->cap_effective,
CAP_REGULAR_SET);
}
- if (old_euid != 0 && current->euid == 0) {
+ if (old_euid != 0 && current->euid == 0 && !current->keep_capabilities) {
current->cap_effective = current->cap_permitted;
}
}
-
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