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Message-ID: <20060915153918.GA29528@clipper.ens.fr>
Date: Fri, 15 Sep 2006 17:39:18 +0200
From: David Madore <david.madore@....fr>
To: Linux Kernel mailing-list <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
LSM mailing-list <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH] security: add a mount option to make caps inheritable, re-enable CAP_SETPCAP
Attempt to make capabilities mildly useful, without breaking anything
and while still adhering to POSIX.1e semantics:
* add a "inhcaps" mount option (MS_INHCAPS) which provides full
executable inheritable and effective sets (we cannot provide
finer-grained control over the mask, as fs-independent mount
options are only one bit wide each);
* re-enable CAP_SETPCAP which had been disabled following an
incorrect analysis of a past sendmail security hole.
Signed-off-by: David A. Madore <david.madore@....fr>
---
*** IMPORTANT NOTE ***
This patch IS NOT related (nor compatible) with the one posted
a few days ago on this list under the name "new capabilities
patch". The latter was much more ambitious and deviated from
POSIX.1e semantics. It has been abandoned due to heavy
criticism on LKML. *This* patch is much restricted and very
simple, and the author hopes that it will be somewhat
consensual: it does not change the (broken) semantics of
capabilities in any way, only adds a mount option to enable
inheritance; it also does not add any new capabilities, change
the size of the capability sets or anything of the sort. It
does not add any filesystem support for capabilities (only
per-mount support), but should be compatible with patches
which add such support.
Note that you need a patched version of mount (not
provided...) to use the new "inhcaps" mount option.
fs/namespace.c | 5 ++++-
include/linux/capability.h | 2 +-
include/linux/fs.h | 1 +
include/linux/mount.h | 1 +
security/commoncap.c | 10 ++++++++--
5 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/namespace.c b/fs/namespace.c
index fa7ed6a..63b6227 100644
--- a/fs/namespace.c
+++ b/fs/namespace.c
@@ -376,6 +376,7 @@ static int show_vfsmnt(struct seq_file *
{ MNT_NOEXEC, ",noexec" },
{ MNT_NOATIME, ",noatime" },
{ MNT_NODIRATIME, ",nodiratime" },
+ { MNT_INHCAPS, ",inhcaps" },
{ 0, NULL }
};
struct proc_fs_info *fs_infop;
@@ -1413,9 +1414,11 @@ long do_mount(char *dev_name, char *dir_
mnt_flags |= MNT_NOATIME;
if (flags & MS_NODIRATIME)
mnt_flags |= MNT_NODIRATIME;
+ if (flags & MS_INHCAPS)
+ mnt_flags |= MNT_INHCAPS;
flags &= ~(MS_NOSUID | MS_NOEXEC | MS_NODEV | MS_ACTIVE |
- MS_NOATIME | MS_NODIRATIME);
+ MS_NOATIME | MS_NODIRATIME | MS_INHCAPS);
/* ... and get the mountpoint */
retval = path_lookup(dir_name, LOOKUP_FOLLOW, &nd);
diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h
index 6548b35..e37a268 100644
--- a/include/linux/capability.h
+++ b/include/linux/capability.h
@@ -312,7 +312,7 @@ #endif
#define CAP_EMPTY_SET to_cap_t(0)
#define CAP_FULL_SET to_cap_t(~0)
-#define CAP_INIT_EFF_SET to_cap_t(~0 & ~CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SETPCAP))
+#define CAP_INIT_EFF_SET to_cap_t(~0)
#define CAP_INIT_INH_SET to_cap_t(0)
#define CAP_TO_MASK(x) (1 << (x))
diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h
index 555bc19..b41e515 100644
--- a/include/linux/fs.h
+++ b/include/linux/fs.h
@@ -106,6 +106,7 @@ #define MS_SYNCHRONOUS 16 /* Writes are
#define MS_REMOUNT 32 /* Alter flags of a mounted FS */
#define MS_MANDLOCK 64 /* Allow mandatory locks on an FS */
#define MS_DIRSYNC 128 /* Directory modifications are synchronous */
+#define MS_INHCAPS 256 /* Inherit capabilities by default */
#define MS_NOATIME 1024 /* Do not update access times. */
#define MS_NODIRATIME 2048 /* Do not update directory access times */
#define MS_BIND 4096
diff --git a/include/linux/mount.h b/include/linux/mount.h
index 403d1a9..b744823 100644
--- a/include/linux/mount.h
+++ b/include/linux/mount.h
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ #define MNT_NODEV 0x02
#define MNT_NOEXEC 0x04
#define MNT_NOATIME 0x08
#define MNT_NODIRATIME 0x10
+#define MNT_INHCAPS 0x20
#define MNT_SHRINKABLE 0x100
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index f50fc29..2488ed5 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ #include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
#include <linux/file.h>
+#include <linux/mount.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/mman.h>
#include <linux/pagemap.h>
@@ -114,9 +115,14 @@ int cap_bprm_set_security (struct linux_
/* Copied from fs/exec.c:prepare_binprm. */
/* We don't have VFS support for capabilities yet */
- cap_clear (bprm->cap_inheritable);
+ if (bprm->file->f_vfsmnt->mnt_flags & MNT_INHCAPS) {
+ cap_set_full (bprm->cap_inheritable);
+ cap_set_full (bprm->cap_effective);
+ } else {
+ cap_clear (bprm->cap_inheritable);
+ cap_clear (bprm->cap_effective);
+ }
cap_clear (bprm->cap_permitted);
- cap_clear (bprm->cap_effective);
/* To support inheritance of root-permissions and suid-root
* executables under compatibility mode, we raise all three
-
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