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Message-ID: <20060918120424.GA5370@elf.ucw.cz>
Date: Mon, 18 Sep 2006 14:04:24 +0200
From: Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>
To: Joshua Brindle <method@...too.org>
Cc: David Madore <david.madore@....fr>,
Alan Cox <alan@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk>,
Linux Kernel mailing-list <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
LSM mailing-list <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/4] security: capabilities patch (version 0.4.4), part 3/4: introduce new capabilities
Hi!
> > > The benefits of this are so minuscule and the cost is so high if you are
> > > ever to use it that it simply won't happen..
> >
> > I'm withdrawing that patch anyway, in favor of a LSM-style approach,
> > the "cuppabilities" module (cf. the patch I posted a couple of hours
> > ago with that word in the title, and I'll be posting a new version in
> > a day or so, or cf. <URL:
> > http://www.madore.org/~david/linux/cuppabilities/
> > >). In this case, the relative cost will be lower since the
> > security_ops->inode_permission() hook is called no matter what.
> >
>
> You misunderstand. I don't mean the performance cost is high, I mean the
> cost of an application to actually be able to run without open() (what I
> was saying before, static built, no glibc, no conf files, no name
> lookups, etc). I never see this being used in the real world because of
> the extreme limitations.
It is already being used. See config_seccomp.
Pavel
--
(english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek
(cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html
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