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Message-ID: <451562F3.90103@aknet.ru>
Date: Sat, 23 Sep 2006 20:38:11 +0400
From: Stas Sergeev <stsp@...et.ru>
To: Hugh Dickins <hugh@...itas.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@...l.org>, Ulrich Drepper <drepper@...hat.com>,
Linux kernel <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [patch] remove MNT_NOEXEC check for PROT_EXEC mmaps
Hi.
Hugh Dickins wrote:
> nor with shm_open. It's just that the kernel is not allowing
> mmap PROT_EXEC on a MNT_NOEXEC mount. Which seems reasonable
Even for the MAP_PRIVATE mmaps? But what does that solve?
Even if you restrict mprotect() too, the malicious app will
simply read() the code in the anonymously mapped region,
while the properly-written code just breaks.
Is it documented in any spec or done in any other system?
> If that's a problem for something, don't mount "noexec"
Yes, I myself think "noexec" is rather useless and can always
be bypassed. But whether that particular handling is correct,
doesn't look obvious to me.
>> Thanks for the pointer, but that looks like the user-space
>> issue to me. Why ld.so can't figure out the "noexecness" and
>> do the right thing itself?
> That would be tiresome work.
>> Or does it figure out the "noexecness"
>> exactly by trying the PROT_EXEC mmap and see if it fails?
> Exactly.
So do you mean such a checks were added as a quick hack till
the proper solution is implemented? That may explain the issue,
at least partially...
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