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Message-Id: <11629899491709-git-send-email-vsu@altlinux.ru>
Date: Wed, 8 Nov 2006 15:45:45 +0300
From: Sergey Vlasov <vsu@...linux.ru>
To: Chris Wright <chrisw@...s-sol.org>
Cc: Zack Weinberg <zackw@...ix.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
Sergey Vlasov <vsu@...linux.ru>
Subject: [RFC PATCH 2/2] security: allow reads from an open /proc/kmsg fd by unprivileged processes
With the added check for syslog open rights in sys_syslog() it is
possible to relax restrictions on syslog access in cap_syslog() and
dummy_syslog(), so that a process could open /proc/kmsg, then drop all
privileges including CAP_SYS_ADMIN, and still be able to use the
/proc/kmsg file descriptor for reading kernel messages.
selinux_syslog() is not modified - a process which handles kernel
messages still needs to have the "syslog_mod" permission.
Signed-off-by: Sergey Vlasov <vsu@...linux.ru>
---
security/commoncap.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++++++---
security/dummy.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++++++---
2 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index f50fc29..966cfce 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -311,9 +311,27 @@ void cap_task_reparent_to_init (struct t
int cap_syslog (int type)
{
- if ((type != 3 && type != 10) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
- return -EPERM;
- return 0;
+ switch (type) {
+ case 3: /* Read last kernel messages */
+ case 10: /* Size of the log buffer */
+ /* Allow dmesg for unprivileged users. */
+ return 0;
+
+ case 2: /* Read from log */
+ case 9: /* Number of chars in the log buffer */
+ /*
+ * Allow read() and poll() on a /proc/kmsg file descriptor
+ * opened by a privileged process. This does not enable
+ * uncontrolled access through the syslog system call, because
+ * sys_syslog() additionally checks the syslog open permission.
+ */
+ return 0;
+
+ default:
+ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
+ return 0;
+ }
}
int cap_vm_enough_memory(long pages)
diff --git a/security/dummy.c b/security/dummy.c
index 58c6d39..3da65fe 100644
--- a/security/dummy.c
+++ b/security/dummy.c
@@ -96,9 +96,27 @@ static int dummy_quota_on (struct dentry
static int dummy_syslog (int type)
{
- if ((type != 3 && type != 10) && current->euid)
- return -EPERM;
- return 0;
+ switch (type) {
+ case 3: /* Read last kernel messages */
+ case 10: /* Size of the log buffer */
+ /* Allow dmesg for unprivileged users. */
+ return 0;
+
+ case 2: /* Read from log */
+ case 9: /* Number of chars in the log buffer */
+ /*
+ * Allow read() and poll() on a /proc/kmsg file descriptor
+ * opened by a privileged process. This does not enable
+ * uncontrolled access through the syslog system call, because
+ * sys_syslog() additionally checks the syslog open permission.
+ */
+ return 0;
+
+ default:
+ if (current->euid)
+ return -EPERM;
+ return 0;
+ }
}
static int dummy_settime(struct timespec *ts, struct timezone *tz)
--
1.4.3.3.gddcc6
-
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