| lists.openwall.net | lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC | |
|
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
| ||
|
Message-ID: <20061109061021.GA32696@sergelap.austin.ibm.com>
Date: Thu, 9 Nov 2006 00:10:21 -0600
From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@...ibm.com>
To: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@...ibm.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>,
James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
Chris Wright <chrisw@...s-sol.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...l.org>,
KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@...gai.gr.jp>,
Chris Friedhoff <chris@...edhoff.org>,
Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@...il.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/1] security: introduce fs caps
Sorry, I should have noticed and fixed this much sooner. This
patch is against the latest full fscaps patch which I'm replying
to.
From: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@...ibm.com>
Date: Thu, 9 Nov 2006 00:01:49 -0600
Subject: security: file caps: fix unused variable warnings
Address warnings of unused variables at cap_bprm_set_security
when file capabilities are disabled, and simultaneously clean
up the code a little, by pulling the new code into a helper
function.
Rename vfs_cap_data_struct to remove redundant '_struct'.
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@...ibm.com>
---
security/commoncap.c | 73 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------
1 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index 6f5e46c..4b50b4d 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -109,16 +109,17 @@ void cap_capset_set (struct task_struct
target->cap_permitted = *permitted;
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FS_CAPABILITIES
#define XATTR_CAPS_SUFFIX "capability"
#define XATTR_NAME_CAPS XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_CAPS_SUFFIX
-struct vfs_cap_data_struct {
+struct vfs_cap_data {
__u32 version;
__u32 effective;
__u32 permitted;
__u32 inheritable;
};
-static inline void convert_to_le(struct vfs_cap_data_struct *cap)
+static inline void convert_to_le(struct vfs_cap_data *cap)
{
cap->version = le32_to_cpu(cap->version);
cap->effective = le32_to_cpu(cap->effective);
@@ -126,7 +127,7 @@ static inline void convert_to_le(struct
cap->inheritable = le32_to_cpu(cap->inheritable);
}
-static int check_cap_sanity(struct vfs_cap_data_struct *cap)
+static int check_cap_sanity(struct vfs_cap_data *cap)
{
int i;
@@ -149,39 +150,14 @@ static int check_cap_sanity(struct vfs_c
return 0;
}
-int cap_bprm_set_security (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+/* Locate any VFS capabilities: */
+static int set_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
struct dentry *dentry;
ssize_t rc;
- struct vfs_cap_data_struct cap_struct;
+ struct vfs_cap_data cap_struct;
struct inode *inode;
- /* Copied from fs/exec.c:prepare_binprm. */
-
- cap_clear (bprm->cap_inheritable);
- cap_clear (bprm->cap_permitted);
- cap_clear (bprm->cap_effective);
-
- /* To support inheritance of root-permissions and suid-root
- * executables under compatibility mode, we raise all three
- * capability sets for the file.
- *
- * If only the real uid is 0, we only raise the inheritable
- * and permitted sets of the executable file.
- */
-
- if (!issecure (SECURE_NOROOT)) {
- if (bprm->e_uid == 0 || current->uid == 0) {
- cap_set_full (bprm->cap_inheritable);
- cap_set_full (bprm->cap_permitted);
- }
- if (bprm->e_uid == 0)
- cap_set_full (bprm->cap_effective);
- }
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FS_CAPABILITIES
- /* Locate any VFS capabilities: */
-
dentry = dget(bprm->file->f_dentry);
inode = dentry->d_inode;
if (!inode->i_op || !inode->i_op->getxattr) {
@@ -216,9 +192,42 @@ #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FS_CAPABILITIES
bprm->cap_permitted = cap_struct.permitted;
bprm->cap_inheritable = cap_struct.inheritable;
-#endif
return 0;
}
+#else
+static int set_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
+int cap_bprm_set_security (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+ /* Copied from fs/exec.c:prepare_binprm. */
+
+ cap_clear (bprm->cap_inheritable);
+ cap_clear (bprm->cap_permitted);
+ cap_clear (bprm->cap_effective);
+
+ /* To support inheritance of root-permissions and suid-root
+ * executables under compatibility mode, we raise all three
+ * capability sets for the file.
+ *
+ * If only the real uid is 0, we only raise the inheritable
+ * and permitted sets of the executable file.
+ */
+
+ if (!issecure (SECURE_NOROOT)) {
+ if (bprm->e_uid == 0 || current->uid == 0) {
+ cap_set_full (bprm->cap_inheritable);
+ cap_set_full (bprm->cap_permitted);
+ }
+ if (bprm->e_uid == 0)
+ cap_set_full (bprm->cap_effective);
+ }
+
+ return set_file_caps(bprm);
+}
void cap_bprm_apply_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe)
{
--
1.4.1
-
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
Powered by blists - more mailing lists