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Message-ID: <15153.1163593562@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 15 Nov 2006 12:26:02 +0000
From: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
To: James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...l.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...l.org>,
Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>,
trond.myklebust@....uio.no, selinux@...ho.nsa.gov,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, aviro@...hat.com, steved@...hat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 12/19] CacheFiles: Permit a process's create SID to be overridden
James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org> wrote:
> > +static u32 selinux_set_fscreate_secid(u32 secid)
> ...
> The ability to set this needs to be mediated via MAC policy.
There could a problem with that... Is it possible for there to be a race? I
have to call the function twice per cache op: once to set the file creation
security ID and once to restore it back to what it was.
However, what happens if I can't restore the original security ID (perhaps the
rules changed between the two invocations)? I can't let the task continue as
it's now running with the wrong security...
David
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