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Message-ID: <26860.1163607813@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 15 Nov 2006 16:23:33 +0000
From: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
To: James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...l.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...l.org>,
Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>,
trond.myklebust@....uio.no, selinux@...ho.nsa.gov,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, aviro@...hat.com, steved@...hat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 12/19] CacheFiles: Permit a process's create SID to be overridden
James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org> wrote:
> Well, the value can be changed at any time, so you could be using a
> temporary fscreate value, or your new value could be overwritten
> immediately by writing to /proc/$$/attr/fscreate
Ah. Hmmm. By whom? In selinux_setprocattr():
if (current != p) {
/* SELinux only allows a process to change its own
security attributes. */
return -EACCES;
}
But current busy inside the cache and can't do this.
> I think we need to add a separate field for this purpose, which can only
> be written to via the in-kernel API and overrides fscreate.
So, like my acts-as security ID patch?
Would it still need to be controlled by MAC policy in that case? Doing so is
a bit of a pain as it means I have a whole bunch of extra failures I still
need to check for, and the race in which the rules might change is still a
possibility I have to deal with.
David
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