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Message-Id: <1164048073.13758.29.camel@moss-spartans.epoch.ncsc.mil>
Date: Mon, 20 Nov 2006 13:41:13 -0500
From: Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>
To: James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...l.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...l.org>, trond.myklebust@....uio.no,
selinux@...ho.nsa.gov, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
aviro@...hat.com, steved@...hat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 12/19] CacheFiles: Permit a process's create SID to be
overridden
On Tue, 2006-11-14 at 16:19 -0500, James Morris wrote:
> On Tue, 14 Nov 2006, David Howells wrote:
>
> > +static u32 selinux_set_fscreate_secid(u32 secid)
> > +{
> > + struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
> > + u32 oldsid = tsec->create_sid;
> > +
> > + tsec->create_sid = secid;
> > + return oldsid;
> > +}
>
> The ability to set this needs to be mediated via MAC policy.
>
> See selinux_setprocattr()
That's different - selinux_set_fscreate_secid() is for internal use by a
kernel module that wishes to temporarily assume a particular fscreate
SID, whereas selinux_setprocattr() handles userspace writes
to /proc/self/attr nodes. Imposing a permission check here makes no
sense.
--
Stephen Smalley
National Security Agency
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