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Message-ID: <XMMS.LNX.4.64.0611201727470.31270@d.namei>
Date: Mon, 20 Nov 2006 17:29:25 -0500 (EST)
From: James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>
To: Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>
cc: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...l.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...l.org>, trond.myklebust@....uio.no,
selinux@...ho.nsa.gov, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
aviro@...hat.com, steved@...hat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 12/19] CacheFiles: Permit a process's create SID to be
overridden
On Mon, 20 Nov 2006, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> > The ability to set this needs to be mediated via MAC policy.
> >
> > See selinux_setprocattr()
>
> That's different - selinux_set_fscreate_secid() is for internal use by a
> kernel module that wishes to temporarily assume a particular fscreate
> SID, whereas selinux_setprocattr() handles userspace writes
> to /proc/self/attr nodes. Imposing a permission check here makes no
> sense.
Well, the hook is exported generally to the kernel, so we need to
ensure that it is documented with a big warning. The name of the hook
should perhaps make it more obvious, like set_internal_ or so.
- James
--
James Morris
<jmorris@...ei.org>
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