linux-kernel - Re: Entropy Pool Contents

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Message-ID: <456C3A54.30702@tromer.org>
Date:	Tue, 28 Nov 2006 15:32:04 +0200
From:	Eran Tromer <eran@...mer.org>
To:	Kyle Moffett <mrmacman_g4@....com>
CC:	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: Entropy Pool Contents

On 2006-11-27 23:52, Kyle Moffett wrote:
> Actually, our current /dev/random implementation is secure even if the
> cryptographic algorithms can be broken under traditional circumstances. 

This is far from obvious, and in my opinion incorrect. David explained
this very well in his follow-up. Other pertinent references are
Gutterman Pinkas Reinman '06 [1], Barak and Halevi '05 [2, Section 5.1],
and the "/dev/random is probably not" thread [3].

The current algorithm is probably OK for casual users in normal
circumstances, but advertising it as absolutely secure is dangerously
misleading.

  Eran

[1] http://www.gutterman.net/publications/GuttermanPinkasReinman2006.pdf
[2] http://eprint.iacr.org/2005/029
[3] http://www.mail-archive.com/cryptography@metzdowd.com/msg04215.html

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