linux-kernel - [PATCH 57/59] sysctl: allow sysctl_perm to be called from outside of sysctl.c

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Message-Id: <11689657031417-git-send-email-ebiederm@xmission.com>
Date:	Tue, 16 Jan 2007 09:40:02 -0700
From:	"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>
To:	"<Andrew Morton" <akpm@...l.org>
Cc:	<linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, <containers@...ts.osdl.org>,
	<netdev@...r.kernel.org>, xfs-masters@....sgi.com, xfs@....sgi.com,
	linux-scsi@...r.kernel.org, James.Bottomley@...elEye.com,
	minyard@....org, openipmi-developer@...ts.sourceforge.net,
	<tony.luck@...el.com>, linux-mips@...ux-mips.org,
	ralf@...ux-mips.org, schwidefsky@...ibm.com,
	heiko.carstens@...ibm.com, linux390@...ibm.com,
	linux-390@...marist.edu, paulus@...ba.org, linuxppc-dev@...abs.org,
	lethal@...ux-sh.org, linuxsh-shmedia-dev@...ts.sourceforge.net,
	<ak@...e.de>, vojtech@...e.cz, clemens@...isch.de,
	a.zummo@...ertech.it, rtc-linux@...glegroups.com,
	linux-parport@...ts.infradead.org, andrea@...e.de,
	tim@...erelk.net, philb@....org, aharkes@...cmu.edu,
	coda@...cmu.edu, codalist@...EMANN.coda.cs.cmu.edu,
	aia21@...tab.net, linux-ntfs-dev@...ts.sourceforge.net,
	mark.fasheh@...cle.com, kurt.hackel@...cle.com,
	"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>
Subject: [PATCH 57/59] sysctl: allow sysctl_perm to be called from outside of sysctl.c

From: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@...ssion.com> - unquoted

Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@...ssion.com>
---
 include/linux/sysctl.h |    2 ++
 kernel/sysctl.c        |   10 +++++-----
 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/sysctl.h b/include/linux/sysctl.h
index 81ee9ea..20c23b5 100644
--- a/include/linux/sysctl.h
+++ b/include/linux/sysctl.h
@@ -924,8 +924,10 @@ enum
 #include <linux/list.h>
 
 /* For the /proc/sys support */
+struct ctl_table;
 extern struct ctl_table_header *sysctl_head_next(struct ctl_table_header *prev);
 extern void sysctl_head_finish(struct ctl_table_header *prev);
+extern int sysctl_perm(struct ctl_table *table, int op);
 
 extern void sysctl_init(void);
 
diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c
index ca2831a..ec5e4a1 100644
--- a/kernel/sysctl.c
+++ b/kernel/sysctl.c
@@ -1154,7 +1154,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_sysctl(struct __sysctl_args __user *args)
 #endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL_SYSCALL */
 
 /*
- * ctl_perm does NOT grant the superuser all rights automatically, because
+ * sysctl_perm does NOT grant the superuser all rights automatically, because
  * some sysctl variables are readonly even to root.
  */
 
@@ -1169,7 +1169,7 @@ static int test_perm(int mode, int op)
 	return -EACCES;
 }
 
-static inline int ctl_perm(ctl_table *table, int op)
+int sysctl_perm(ctl_table *table, int op)
 {
 	int error;
 	error = security_sysctl(table, op);
@@ -1196,7 +1196,7 @@ repeat:
 		if (n == table->ctl_name) {
 			int error;
 			if (table->child) {
-				if (ctl_perm(table, 001))
+				if (sysctl_perm(table, 001))
 					return -EPERM;
 				name++;
 				nlen--;
@@ -1225,7 +1225,7 @@ int do_sysctl_strategy (ctl_table *table,
 		op |= 004;
 	if (newval) 
 		op |= 002;
-	if (ctl_perm(table, op))
+	if (sysctl_perm(table, op))
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	if (table->strategy) {
@@ -1495,7 +1495,7 @@ static ssize_t do_rw_proc(int write, struct file * file, char __user * buf,
 			goto out;
 		error = -EPERM;
 		op = (write ? 002 : 004);
-		if (ctl_perm(table, op))
+		if (sysctl_perm(table, op))
 			goto out;
 		
 		/* careful: calling conventions are nasty here */
-- 
1.4.4.1.g278f

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