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Message-Id: <1D317613-B0B6-4517-81B5-DBF3978FA413@mac.com>
Date: Sun, 21 Jan 2007 19:36:27 -0500
From: Kyle Moffett <mrmacman_g4@....com>
To: David Wagner <daw-usenet@...erner.cs.berkeley.edu>
Cc: LKML Kernel <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Samium Gromoff <_deepfire@...lingofgreen.ru>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] Undo some of the pseudo-security madness
On Jan 21, 2007, at 18:34:56, David Wagner wrote:
> [1] In comparison, suidperl was designed to be installed setuid-
> root, and it takes special precautions to be safe in this usage.
> (And even it has had some security vulnerabilities, despite its
> best efforts, which illustrates how tricky this business can be.)
> Setting the setuid-root bit on a large complex interpreter that
> wasn't designed to be setuid-root seems like a pretty dubious
> proposition to me.
Well, there's also the fact that Linux does *NOT* need suidperl, as
it has proper secure support for suid pound-bang scripts anyways.
The only reason for suidperl in the first place was broken operating
systems which had a race condition between the operating system
checking the suid bits and reading the '#! /usr/bin/perl' line in the
file, and the interpreter getting executed and opening a different
file (think symlink redirection attacks). I believe Linux jumps
through some special hoops to ensure that can't happen.
Cheers,
Kyle Moffett
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