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Message-ID: <Pine.LNX.4.64.0701291017520.11801@d.namei>
Date: Mon, 29 Jan 2007 10:23:41 -0500 (EST)
From: James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>
To: Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>
cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...l.org>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...e.hu>,
tglx@...utronix.de, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
selinux@...ho.nsa.gov, Eric Paris <eparis@...isplace.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] sysctl selinux: Don't look at table->de
On Mon, 29 Jan 2007, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> NAK. Mapping all sysctls to a single security label prevents any kind
> of fine-grained security on sysctls, and current policies already make
> use of the current distinctions to limit access to particular sets of
> sysctls to particular processes. As is, I'd expect breakage of current
> systems running SELinux from this patch, because (confined) processes
> that formerly only required access to specific sysctl labels will
> suddenly run into denials on the generic fallback label.
Agreed, 100% NACK.
Please don't just simply remove long-researched & analyzed MAC security
which has been in the kernel for years, which is being used in the field
for high assurance systems, because you neglected to consider it during a
code cleanup.
- James
--
James Morris
<jmorris@...ei.org>
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