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Message-ID: <m1ps8k6yn1.fsf_-_@ebiederm.dsl.xmission.com>
Date: Thu, 08 Feb 2007 16:02:58 -0700
From: ebiederm@...ssion.com (Eric W. Biederman)
To: Andrew Morton <akpm@...l.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...e.hu>,
tglx@...utronix.de, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
selinux@...ho.nsa.gov, James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>
Subject: [PATCH 4/5] selinux: Enhance selinux to always ignore private inodes.
From: Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>
Hmmm...turns out to not be quite enough, as the /proc/sys inodes aren't
truly private to the fs, so we can run into them in a variety of
security hooks beyond just the inode hooks, such as
security_file_permission (when reading and writing them via the vfs
helpers), security_sb_mount (when mounting other filesystems on
directories in proc like binfmt_misc), and deeper within the security
module itself (as in flush_unauthorized_files upon inheritance across
execve). So I think we have to add an IS_PRIVATE() guard within
SELinux, as below. Note however that the use of the private flag here
could be confusing, as these inodes are _not_ private to the fs, are
exposed to userspace, and security modules must implement the sysctl
hook to get any access control over them.
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@...ssion.com>
---
security/selinux/hooks.c | 3 +++
1 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index de16b9f..ff9fccc 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -1077,6 +1077,9 @@ static int inode_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
struct inode_security_struct *isec;
struct avc_audit_data ad;
+ if (unlikely (IS_PRIVATE (inode)))
+ return 0;
+
tsec = tsk->security;
isec = inode->i_security;
--
-
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