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Message-ID: <20070209150951.GA6026@localhost.sw.ru>
Date: Fri, 9 Feb 2007 18:09:51 +0300
From: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@...nvz.org>
To: akpm@...l.org
Cc: pasky@...e.cz, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, devel@...nvz.org,
oleg@...sign.ru
Subject: [PATCH v3] Allow access to /proc/$PID/fd after setuid()
/proc/$PID/fd has r-x------ permissions, so if process does setuid(), it
will not be able to access /proc/*/fd/. This breaks fstatat() emulation
in glibc.
open("foo", O_RDONLY|O_DIRECTORY) = 4
setuid32(65534) = 0
stat64("/proc/self/fd/4/bar", 0xbfafb298) = -1 EACCES (Permission denied)
Comments and suggestions from Andrew Morton and Oleg Nesterov.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@...nvz.org>
---
fs/proc/base.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 18 insertions(+)
--- a/fs/proc/base.c
+++ b/fs/proc/base.c
@@ -1414,10 +1414,28 @@ static struct file_operations proc_fd_op
};
/*
+ * /proc/pid/fd needs a special permission handler so that a process can still
+ * access /proc/self/fd after it has executed a setuid().
+ */
+static int proc_fd_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask,
+ struct nameidata *nd)
+{
+ int rv;
+
+ rv = generic_permission(inode, mask, NULL);
+ if (rv == 0)
+ return 0;
+ if (task_pid(current) == proc_pid(inode))
+ rv = 0;
+ return rv;
+}
+
+/*
* proc directories can do almost nothing..
*/
static struct inode_operations proc_fd_inode_operations = {
.lookup = proc_lookupfd,
+ .permission = proc_fd_permission,
.setattr = proc_setattr,
};
-
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