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Message-ID: <20070213164939.GA16394@elte.hu>
Date: Tue, 13 Feb 2007 17:49:39 +0100
From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...e.hu>
To: Andi Kleen <andi@...stfloor.org>
Cc: Alan <alan@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Arjan van de Ven <arjan@...radead.org>,
Christoph Hellwig <hch@...radead.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@....com.au>,
Ulrich Drepper <drepper@...hat.com>,
Zach Brown <zach.brown@...cle.com>,
Evgeniy Polyakov <johnpol@....mipt.ru>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
Benjamin LaHaise <bcrl@...ck.org>,
Suparna Bhattacharya <suparna@...ibm.com>,
Davide Libenzi <davidel@...ilserver.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
Subject: Re: [patch 00/11] ANNOUNCE: "Syslets", generic asynchronous system call support
* Andi Kleen <andi@...stfloor.org> wrote:
> > sys_exec and other security boundaries must be synchronous
> > only and not allow async "spill over" (consider setuid async binary
> > patching)
>
> He probably would need some generalization of Andrea's seccomp work.
> Perhaps using bitmaps? For paranoia I would suggest to white list, not
> black list calls.
what i've implemented in my tree is sys_async_call_table[] which is a
copy of sys_call_table[] with certain entries modified (by architecture
level code, not by kernel/async.c) to sys_ni_syscall(). It's up to the
architecture to decide which syscalls are allowed.
but i could use a bitmap too - whatever linear construct. [ I'm not sure
there's much connection to seccomp - seccomp uses a NULL terminated
whitelist - while syslets would use most of the entries (and would not
want to have the overhead of checking a blacklist). ]
Ingo
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