linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH 0/6] MODSIGN: Kernel module signing

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Date:	Thu, 15 Feb 2007 22:13:04 +0000
From:	Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>
To:	David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
Cc:	torvalds@...l.org, akpm@...l.org, herbert.xu@...hat.com,
	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, davej@...hat.com,
	arjan@...radead.org, linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/6] MODSIGN: Kernel module signing

Hi!

> Now, this is not a complete solution by any means: the core kernel is not
> protected, and nor are /dev/mem or /dev/kmem, but it denies (or at least
> controls) one relatively simple attack vector.

Could we fix the /dev/*mem holes, first? They are already used by
malicious modules (aka rootkits...).  Or can selinux already provide
/dev/*mem protection with no way for admin to turn it off?

-- 
(english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek
(cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html
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