linux-kernel - Re: [RFC][Patch 2/6] integrity: fs hook placement

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Date:	Thu, 08 Mar 2007 14:22:29 -0500
From:	Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>
To:	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@...ibm.com>
Cc:	Chris Wright <chrisw@...s-sol.org>,
	Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>,
	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, safford@...son.ibm.com,
	serue@...ux.vnet.ibm.com, kjhall@...ux.vnet.ibm.com,
	zohar@...ibm.com
Subject: Re: [RFC][Patch 2/6] integrity: fs hook placement

On Thu, 2007-03-08 at 12:01 -0600, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> Quoting Chris Wright (chrisw@...s-sol.org):
> > * Serge E. Hallyn (serue@...ibm.com) wrote:
> > > Are you objecting only to the duplication at the callsites, so that an
> > > fsnotify-type of consolidation of security and integrity hooks would be
> > > ok?  Or are you complaining that the security_inode_setxattr and
> > > integrity_inode_setxattr hooks are too similar anyway, and integrity
> > > modules should just use some lsm hooks for anything which will be
> > > authoritative?
> > 
> > It's duplication of callsites with many identical implementations
> > that's the problem.
> 
> Yes it's ugly...
> 
> But I guess it gets a point across :)
> 
> > > (I could see an argument that integirty subsystem should be purely for
> > > measuring and hence its hooks should never return a value.  Only hitch
> > > there is that if integrity subsystem hits ENOMEM it should be able to
> > > refuse the action...)
> > 
> > Right, that's what I was expecting to see, just the measurement
> > infrastructure.
> 
> So what you are saying is EVM would stay an LSM, with a cooperating
> integrity subsystem *just* doing measurements?
> 
> That's kind of what i was expecting too, however that doesn't fit as
> well with the idea that an integrity subsystem prevents the need for lsm
> stacking.  I think the idea was that evm would still be able to enforce
> integrity of selinux xattrs without it stack with selinux.  So I can see
> where this approach came from.

The enforcement mechanism should be directly integrated into SELinux,
not stacked as a separate module.

-- 
Stephen Smalley
National Security Agency

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