linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH RESEND 1/1] crypto API: RSA algorithm patch (kernel version 2.6.20.1)

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Message-ID: <3118.81.207.0.53.1174480598.squirrel@secure.samage.net>
Date:	Wed, 21 Mar 2007 13:36:38 +0100 (CET)
From:	"Indan Zupancic" <indan@....nu>
To:	"Tasos Parisinos" <t.parisinos@...ensis.com>
Cc:	"Francois Romieu" <romieu@...zoreil.com>,
	herbert@...dor.apana.org.au, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH RESEND 1/1] crypto API: RSA algorithm patch (kernel     
      version 2.6.20.1)

On Wed, March 21, 2007 10:15, Tasos Parisinos wrote:
> Protecting a TripleDES key in high security standards is not as
> simple as making the kernel read
> protected, you need a whole lot and
> that also means hardware (cryptomemories e.t.c)
> So you forget about all this overhead when you use assymetric

Ah, you're talking about fishing the key out of RAM here, right?
My point stays the same for that: If you can't read protect the
kernel RAM, small chance you can write protect it. And then they
can just bypass all signature checking you put in it anyway.

Greetings,

Indan


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