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Message-ID: <20070324162326.GC11794@in.ibm.com>
Date: Sat, 24 Mar 2007 21:53:26 +0530
From: Srivatsa Vaddagiri <vatsa@...ibm.com>
To: menage@...gle.com
Cc: sekharan@...ibm.com, ckrm-tech@...ts.sourceforge.net, xemul@...ru,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, rohitseth@...gle.com, pj@....com,
ebiederm@...ssion.com, winget@...gle.com, containers@...ts.osdl.org
Subject: Re: [ckrm-tech] [PATCH 7/7] containers (V7): Container interface to nsproxy subsystem
On Sat, Mar 24, 2007 at 10:35:37AM +0530, Srivatsa Vaddagiri wrote:
> > +static int ns_create(struct container_subsys *ss, struct container *cont)
> > +{
> > + struct nscont *ns;
> > +
> > + if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
> > + return -EPERM;
>
> Does this check break existing namespace semantics in a subtle way?
> It now requires that unshare() of namespaces by any task requires
> CAP_SYS_ADMIN capabilities.
I should clarify that I am referring to unshare thr' clone here (and not
thr' sys_unshare)
> clone(.., CLONE_NEWUTS, ..)->copy_namespaces()->ns_container_clone()->
> ->container_clone()-> .. -> container_create() -> ns_create()
>
> Earlier, one could unshare his uts namespace w/o CAP_SYS_ADMIN
> capabilities. Now it is required. Is that fine? Don't know.
>
> I feel we can avoid this check totally and let the directory permissions
> take care of these checks.
>
> Serge, what do you think?
--
Regards,
vatsa
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