linux-kernel - Re: [patch 0/8] unprivileged mount syscall

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Message-ID: <a4e6962a0704062040q12c0013ek9591b9fbb27caa12@mail.gmail.com>
Date:	Fri, 6 Apr 2007 22:40:20 -0500
From:	"Eric Van Hensbergen" <ericvh@...il.com>
To:	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>
Cc:	"Jan Engelhardt" <jengelh@...ux01.gwdg.de>,
	"Andrew Morton" <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
	"Miklos Szeredi" <miklos@...redi.hu>,
	linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, util-linux-ng@...r.kernel.org,
	containers@...ts.osdl.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [patch 0/8] unprivileged mount syscall

On 4/6/07, H. Peter Anvin <hpa@...or.com> wrote:
> Jan Engelhardt wrote:
> > On Apr 6 2007 16:16, H. Peter Anvin wrote:
> >>>> - users can use bind mounts without having to pre-configure them in
> >>>> /etc/fstab
> >>>>
> >> This is by far the biggest concern I see.  I think the security implication of
> >> allowing anyone to do bind mounts are poorly understood.
> >
> > $ whoami
> > miklos
> > $ mount --bind / ~/down_under
> >
> > later that day:
> > # userdel -r miklos
> >
>
> Consider backups, for example.
>

This is the reason why enforcing private namespaces for user mounts
makes sense.  I think it catches many of these corner cases.

          -eric
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