linux-kernel - Re: [AppArmor 39/41] AppArmor: Profile loading and manipulation, pathname matching

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Message-ID: <20070416205612.GA4030@suse.de>
Date:	Mon, 16 Apr 2007 13:56:12 -0700
From:	John Johansen <jjohansen@...e.de>
To:	Andi Kleen <andi@...stfloor.org>
Cc:	Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@...e.de>, jjohansen@...e.de,
	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, chrisw@...s-sol.org
Subject: Re: [AppArmor 39/41] AppArmor: Profile loading and manipulation, pathname matching

On Mon, Apr 16, 2007 at 08:27:08AM +0200, Andi Kleen wrote:
> > It's nice to check for consistency though, so we're adding that. Profile 
> > loading is a trusted operation, at least so far, and so security wise we 
> > don't actually have to care --- if loading an invalid profile can bring down 
> > the system, then that's no worse than an arbitrary module that crashes the 
> > machine. Not sure if there will ever be user loadable profiles; at least at 
> > that point we had to care.
> 
> A security system that allows to crash the kernel is a little weird 
> though. It would be better to check. Not that a recursion check
> is particularly expensive.
> 
Indeed.  It will be fixed in the next rev.

thanks
john


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