lists.openwall.net   lists  /  announce  owl-users  owl-dev  john-users  john-dev  passwdqc-users  yescrypt  popa3d-users  /  oss-security  kernel-hardening  musl  sabotage  tlsify  passwords  /  crypt-dev  xvendor  /  Bugtraq  Full-Disclosure  linux-kernel  linux-netdev  linux-ext4  linux-hardening  linux-cve-announce  PHC 
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
 
Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.
[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-Id: <1176838111.2813.109.camel@ram.us.ibm.com>
Date:	Tue, 17 Apr 2007 12:28:31 -0700
From:	Ram Pai <linuxram@...ibm.com>
To:	Miklos Szeredi <miklos@...redi.hu>
Cc:	serue@...ibm.com, devel@...nvz.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	containers@...ts.osdl.org, viro@....linux.org.uk,
	linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, akpm@...ux-foundation.org
Subject: Re: [Devel] Re: [patch 05/10] add "permit user mounts in new
	namespace" clone flag

On Tue, 2007-04-17 at 19:44 +0200, Miklos Szeredi wrote:
> > I'm a bit lost about what is currently done and who advocates for what.
> > 
> > It seems to me the MNT_ALLOWUSERMNT (or whatever :) flag should be
> > propagated.  In the /share rbind+chroot example, I assume the admin
> > would start by doing
> > 
> > 	mount --bind /share /share
> > 	mount --make-slave /share
> > 	mount --bind -o allow_user_mounts /share (or whatever)
> > 	mount --make-shared /share
> > 
> > then on login, pam does
> > 
> > 	chroot /share/$USER
> > 
> > or some sort of
> > 
> > 	mount --bind /share /home/$USER/root
> > 	chroot /home/$USER/root
> > 
> > or whatever.  In any case, the user cannot make user mounts except under
> > /share, and any cloned namespaces will still allow user mounts.
> 
> I don't quite understand your method.  This is how I think of it:
> 
> mount --make-rshared /
> mkdir -p /mnt/ns/$USER
> mount --rbind / /mnt/ns/$USER
> mount --make-rslave /mnt/ns/$USER
> mount --set-flags --recursive -oallowusermnt /mnt/ns/$USER
> chroot /mnt/ns/$USER
> su - $USER
> 
> I did actually try something equivalent (without the fancy mount
> commands though), and it worked fine.  The only "problem" is the
> proliferation of mounts in /proc/mounts.  There was a recently posted
> patch in AppArmor, that at least hides unreachable mounts from
> /proc/mounts, so the user wouldn't see all those.  But it could still
> be pretty confusing to the sysadmin.

unbindable mounts were designed to overcome the proliferation problem.

Your steps should be something like this:

mount --make-rshared /
mkdir -p /mnt/ns
mount --bind /mnt/ns /mnt/ns
mount --make-unbindable /mnt/ns
mkdir -p /mnt/ns/$USER
mount --rbind / /mnt/ns/$USER
mount --make-rslave /mnt/ns/$USER
mount --set-flags --recursive -oallowusermnt /mnt/ns/$USER
chroot /mnt/ns/$USER
su - $USER

try this and your proliferation problem will disappear. :-)

> 
> So in that sense doing it the complicated way, by first cloning the
> namespace, and then copying and sharing mounts individually which need
> to be shared could relieve this somewhat.

the unbindable mount will just provide you permanent relief.

> 
> Another point: user mounts under /proc and /sys shouldn't be allowed.
> There are files there (at least in /proc) that are seemingly writable
> by the user, but they are still not writable in the sense, that
> "normal" files are.
> 
> Anyway, there are lots of userspace policy issues, but those don't
> impact the kernel part.
> 
> As for the original question of propagating the "allowusermnt" flag, I
> think it doesn't matter, as long as it's consistent and documented.
> 
> Propagating some mount flags and not propagating others is
> inconsistent and confusing, so I wouldn't want that.  Currently
> remount doesn't propagate mount flags, that may be a bug, 

For consistency reason, one can propagate all the flags. But
propagating only those flags that interfere with shared-subtree
semantics should suffice.

wait...Dave's read-only bind mounts infact need the ability to
selectively make some mounts readonly. In such cases propagating
the read-only flag will just step on Dave's feature. Wont' it?

RP



> 
> Miklos

-
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at  http://www.tux.org/lkml/

Powered by blists - more mailing lists

Powered by Openwall GNU/*/Linux Powered by OpenVZ