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Open Source and information security mailing list archives
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Date: Tue, 17 Apr 2007 22:58:15 +0100 From: Alan Cox <alan@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk> To: Andi Kleen <andi@...stfloor.org> Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>, Andi Kleen <andi@...stfloor.org>, James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org Subject: Re: AppArmor FAQ > But easy to use security is probably better than complicated security > because normal people will more likely use it. Easy to use security is only better if it *works*, and preferably its excessively secure. Ineffective security is actually worse than no security. Real world examples include people using RFID badges thinking they are secure so removing the use of the conventional key in door lock and people using WEP wireless security so running no encryption or other security on their wireless. Several of whom if statements are to believed then found themselves being sued by the music industry because their IP was used for file sharing. Bad security is dangerous, really dangerous. I'm not sure if AppArmor can be made good security for the general case, but it is a model that works in the limited http environment (eg .htaccess) and is something people can play with and hack on and may be possible to configure to be very secure. Alan - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
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