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Message-ID: <m1647ltgbf.fsf@ebiederm.dsl.xmission.com>
Date: Tue, 24 Apr 2007 19:04:36 -0600
From: ebiederm@...ssion.com (Eric W. Biederman)
To: Karel Zak <kzak@...hat.com>
Cc: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@...redi.hu>, akpm@...ux-foundation.org,
serue@...ibm.com, viro@....linux.org.uk, linuxram@...ibm.com,
linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
containers@...ts.osdl.org
Subject: Re: [patch 0/8] mount ownership and unprivileged mount syscall (v4)
Karel Zak <kzak@...hat.com> writes:
> On Fri, Apr 20, 2007 at 12:25:32PM +0200, Miklos Szeredi wrote:
>> The following extra security measures are taken for unprivileged
>> mounts:
>>
>> - usermounts are limited by a sysctl tunable
>> - force "nosuid,nodev" mount options on the created mount
>
> The original userspace "user=" solution also implies the "noexec"
> option by default (you can override the default by "exec" option).
>
> It means the kernel based solution is not fully compatible ;-(
Why noexec? Either it was a silly or arbitrary decision, or
our kernel design may be incomplete.
Now I can see not wanting to support executables if you are locking
down a system. The classic don't execute a program from a CD just because
the CD was stuck in the drive problem.
So I can see how executing code from an untrusted source could prevent
exploitation of other problems, and we certainly don't want to do it
automatically.
Eric
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