[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <462F87EA.1000002@zytor.com>
Date: Wed, 25 Apr 2007 09:55:06 -0700
From: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>
To: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@...redi.hu>
CC: akpm@...ux-foundation.org, serue@...ibm.com, viro@....linux.org.uk,
linuxram@...ibm.com, ebiederm@...ssion.com,
linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
containers@...ts.osdl.org
Subject: Re: [patch] unprivileged mounts update
Miklos Szeredi wrote:
>
> Andrew, please skip this patch, for now.
>
> Serge found a problem with the fsuid approach: setfsuid(nonzero) will
> remove filesystem related capabilities. So even if root is trying to
> set the "user=UID" flag on a mount, access to the target (and in case
> of bind, the source) is checked with user privileges.
>
> Root should be able to set this flag on any mountpoint, _regardless_
> of permissions.
>
Right, if you're using fsuid != 0, you're not running as root (fsuid is
the equivalent to euid for the filesystem.)
I fail to see how ruid should have *any* impact on mount(2). That seems
to be a design flaw.
-hpa
-
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
Powered by blists - more mailing lists