linux-kernel - Re: [AppArmor 01/41] Pass struct vfsmount to the inode

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Date:	Wed, 23 May 2007 21:28:52 -0400 (EDT)
From:	James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>
To:	Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@...e.de>
cc:	Al Viro <viro@....linux.org.uk>, jjohansen@...e.de,
	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, chrisw@...s-sol.org,
	Tony Jones <tonyj@...e.de>
Subject: Re: [AppArmor 01/41] Pass struct vfsmount to the inode_create LSM
 hook

On Wed, 23 May 2007, Andreas Gruenbacher wrote:

> This is backwards from what AppArmor does. The policy defines which paths may 
> be accessed; all paths not explicitly listed are denied. If files are mounted 
> at multiple locations, then the policy may allow access to some locations but 
> not to others. That's not a hole.

I don't know what else you'd call it.

Would you mind providing some concrete examples of how such a model would 
be useful?


- James
-- 
James Morris
<jmorris@...ei.org>
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