linux-kernel - Re: [AppArmor 01/41] Pass struct vfsmount to the inode

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Message-ID: <87bqg8py9m.fsf@jbms.ath.cx>
Date:	Fri, 25 May 2007 14:13:25 -0400
From:	Jeremy Maitin-Shepard <jbms@....edu>
To:	casey@...aufler-ca.com
Cc:	Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@...e.de>,
	James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [AppArmor 01/41] Pass struct vfsmount to the inode_create LSM hook

Jeremy Maitin-Shepard <jbms@....edu> writes:

> [snip]

> Well, my point was exactly that App Armor doesn't (as far as I know) do
> anything to enforce the argv[0] convention, nor would it in general
> prevent a confined program from making a symlink or hard link.  Even
> disregarding that, it seems very fragile in general to make an suid
> program (there would be no point in confining the execution of a
> non-suid program) perform essentially access control based on argv[0].

Note that by "confining the execution of a non-suid program", I mean
defining an App Armor profile that prevents the execution of a
particular non-suid program, unless of course the program file itself
contains secret information, which is irrelevant to this discussion.

-- 
Jeremy Maitin-Shepard
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