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Message-ID: <312681.33492.qm@web36609.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
Date: Fri, 25 May 2007 13:27:54 -0700 (PDT)
From: Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>
To: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@...e.de>
Cc: Jeremy Maitin-Shepard <jbms@....edu>,
James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [AppArmor 01/41] Pass struct vfsmount to the inode_create LSM hook
--- Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@...e.de> wrote:
> On Friday 25 May 2007 19:43, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> > [...] but the AppArmor code could certainly check for that in exec by
> > enforcing the argv[0] convention. It would be perfectly reasonable for a
> > system that is so dependent on pathnames to require that.
>
> Hmm ... that's a strange idea.
Yeah, I get that a lot.
> AppArmor cannot assume anything about argv[0],
>
> and it would be a really bad idea to change the well-established semantics of
>
> argv[0].
>
> There is no actual need for looking at argv[0], though: AppArmor decides
> based
> on the actual pathname of the executable...
Right. My point was that if you wanted to use the gzip/gunzip
example of a file with two names being treated differently based
on the name accessed as an argument for AppArmor you could. If
you don't want to, that's ok too. Jeremy raised a reasonable objection,
and AppArmor could address it if y'all chose to do so. I seriously
doubt that enforcing the argv[0] convention would break much, and I
also expect that if it did there's a Consultant's Retirement to be
made fixing the security hole it points out.
Casey Schaufler
casey@...aufler-ca.com
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