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Date: Fri, 25 May 2007 01:17:36 -0400 From: Jeremy Maitin-Shepard <jbms@....edu> To: Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com> Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org Subject: Re: [AppArmor 01/41] Pass struct vfsmount to the inode_create LSM hook Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com> writes: > On Fedora zcat, gzip and gunzip are all links to the same file. > I can imagine (although it is a bit of a stretch) allowing a set > of users access to gunzip but not gzip (or the other way around). > There are probably more sophisticated programs that have different > behavior based on the name they're invoked by that would provide > a more compelling arguement, assuming of course that you buy into > the behavior-based-on-name scheme. What I think I'm suggesting is > that AppArmor might be useful in addressing the fact that a file > with multiple hard links is necessarily constrained to have the > same access control on each of those names. That assumes one > believes that such behavior is flawwed, and I'm not going to try > to argue that. The question was about an example, and there is one. This doesn't work. The behavior depends on argv[0], which is not necessarily the same as the name of the file. -- Jeremy Maitin-Shepard - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
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