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Message-Id: <5630E353-1556-4A0F-8618-D885B5BC1842@mac.com>
Date: Sat, 26 May 2007 14:16:26 -0400
From: Kyle Moffett <mrmacman_g4@....com>
To: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-fsdevel@...ove.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Cc: agruen@...e.de, casey@...aufler-ca.com, jmorris@...ei.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: Pass struct vfsmount to the inode_create LSM hook
On May 26, 2007, at 10:44:46, Tetsuo Handa wrote:
> Andreas Gruenbacher wrote:
>> Tetsuo Handa wrote:
>>> Therefore, TOMOYO Linux checks the combination of filename and
>>> argv[0] passed to execve().
>>
>> So you are indeed trying to control the value of argv[0]? Well,
>> good luck with that, but it's totally insane. You are guaranteed
>> to break some applications.
>
> TOMOYO Linux ristricts argv[0] using allow_argv0 syntax.
> "allow_argv0 /bin/bash -bash" to allow passing "/bin/bash" to
> filename and "-bash" to argv[0]. "allow_argv0 /bin/gzip gunzip" to
> allow passing "/bin/gzip" to filename and "gunzip" to argv[0].
> "allow_argv0 /sbin/busybox cat" to allow passing "/sbin/busybox" to
> filename and "cat" to argv[0]. No need to use allow_argv0 syntax
> if the basename of filename and basename of argv[0] are the same
> (i.e. "allow_argv0 /bin/bash bash" is not required). TOMOYO Linux
> doesn't unconditionally forbid passing different values for
> filename and argv[0]. TOMOYO Linux allows passing different values
> for filename and argv[0] only if it is allowed by allow_argv0 syntax.
>
> Could you please explain me why this approach breaks applications?
One of my servers runs 3 different instances of the "kadmind"
Kerberos daemon, one for each realm which I need to be able to modify/
change-passwords/etc. In order to differentiate and stop/restart the
appropriate daemon, I have a simple starter script which runs each
kadmind process with a unique name derived from the realm (EG:
"kadmind(EXAMPLE.COM)", "kadmind(OTHER.EXAMPLE.COM)"). Since this is
a Kerberos server I use a very strict SELinux-based policy, yet my
management tools need to be able to easily add and remove realms in a
secure fashion. It sounds like TOMOYO Linux would not be able to
handle this situation at all; I would either have to completely turn
off that security "feature" and lose most of the functionality of
TOMOYO Linux, or hard-code the list of realms into the policy file
and have to completely reload policy every time I need to add/remove
realms (big gaping security hole).
Cheers,
Kyle Moffett
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