linux-kernel - Re: [AppArmor 01/41] Pass struct vfsmount to the inode

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Message-Id: <200705261410.19541.agruen@suse.de>
Date:	Sat, 26 May 2007 14:10:19 +0200
From:	Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@...e.de>
To:	casey@...aufler-ca.com
Cc:	Jeremy Maitin-Shepard <jbms@....edu>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [AppArmor 01/41] Pass struct vfsmount to the inode_create LSM hook

On Friday 25 May 2007 21:06, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> --- Jeremy Maitin-Shepard <jbms@....edu> wrote:
> > ...
> > Well, my point was exactly that App Armor doesn't (as far as I know) do
> > anything to enforce the argv[0] convention,
>
> Sounds like an opportunity for improvement then.

Jeez, what argv[0] convention are you both talking about? argv[0] is not 
guaranteed to have any association with the name of the executable. Feel free 
to have any discussion about argv[0] you want, but *please* keep it away from 
AppArmor, which really has nothing to do with it.

It would be nice if you could stop calling argv[0] checks ``name-based access 
control'': from the point of view of the kernel no access control is 
involved, and even application-level argv[0] based access control makes no 
sense whatsoever.

Thanks,
Andreas
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