linux-kernel - Re: [AppArmor 01/41] Pass struct vfsmount to the inode

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Message-ID: <Line.LNX.4.64.0705291555020.9955@d.namei>
Date:	Tue, 29 May 2007 15:58:21 -0400 (EDT)
From:	James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>
To:	Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>
cc:	Tetsuo Handa <from-lsm@...ove.SAKURA.ne.jp>,
	linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [AppArmor 01/41] Pass struct vfsmount to the inode_create LSMhook

On Tue, 29 May 2007, Casey Schaufler wrote:

> > Conventional UNIX's access control can't restrict
> > which path_to_file can link with which another_path_to_file
> > because UNIX's access control is a label-based access control.
> 
> UNIX access control is attribute based, not label based. The
> distinction may be hair splitting in the current context, but
> could be significant later if the thread continues. 

What's important is that traditional DAC stores the security attributes 
of the object with the object.  Call them what you want, it matters not.


- James
-- 
James Morris
<jmorris@...ei.org>
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