[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <Line.LNX.4.64.0705301425570.17724@d.namei>
Date: Wed, 30 May 2007 14:29:09 -0400 (EDT)
From: James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>
To: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
cc: Jens Axboe <jens.axboe@...cle.com>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...e.hu>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>
Subject: Re: [PATCH][RFC] security: revalidate rw permissions for sys_splice
and sys_vmsplice
On Wed, 30 May 2007, Andrew Morton wrote:
> On Wed, 30 May 2007 09:15:01 +0200
> Jens Axboe <jens.axboe@...cle.com> wrote:
>
> > On Tue, May 29 2007, James Morris wrote:
> > > Revalidate read/write permissions for splice(2) and vmslice(2), in case
> > > security policy has changed since the files were opened.
> >
> > I guess it was inevitably going to happen :-)
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <jens.axboe@...cle.com>
> >
>
> Probably acked-by was more appropriate.
>
> James, is this considered needed-for-2.6.22?
No, it's tightening things up. We don't have full revocation in any case,
and the primary security check is performed on open.
> > + ret = security_file_permission(out, MAY_WRITE);
> > + if (unlikely(ret < 0))
> > + return ret;
>
>
> ot: all the unlikely()s are irksome. I wonder if there was some way of
> doing this in security_file_permission() instead. eg:
This is the only place where we do this -- it's to remain consistent with
the surrounding splice code, which does this for other checks. Given that
it's calling out to a typically non-trivial security module, it may be
better to remove the unlikelys here.
- James
--
James Morris
<jmorris@...ei.org>
-
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
Powered by blists - more mailing lists