linux-kernel - Re: [AppArmor 01/41] Pass struct vfsmount to the inode

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Message-ID: <12508.1180719875@turing-police.cc.vt.edu>
Date:	Fri, 01 Jun 2007 13:44:35 -0400
From:	Valdis.Kletnieks@...edu
To:	Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>
Cc:	David Wagner <daw-usenet@...erner.cs.berkeley.edu>,
	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [AppArmor 01/41] Pass struct vfsmount to the inode_create LSM hook

On Thu, 24 May 2007 14:47:27 -0000, Pavel Machek said:
> Yes, if there's significantly more remote bad guys than local bad
> guys, and if remote bad guys can't just get some local user first, AA
> still has some value.

Experience over on the Windows side of the fence indicates that "remote bad
guys get some local user first" is a *MAJOR* part of the current real-world
threat model - the vast majority of successful attacks on end-user boxes these
days start off with either "Get user to (click on link|open attachment)" or
"Subvert the path to a website (either by hacking the real site or hijacking
the DNS) and deliver a drive-by fruiting when the user visits the page".

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