[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <20070604115648.GB8614@frankl.hpl.hp.com>
Date: Mon, 4 Jun 2007 04:56:48 -0700
From: Stephane Eranian <eranian@....hp.com>
To: Andi Kleen <andi@...stfloor.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, akpm@...ux-foundation.org,
Stephane Eranian <eranian@....hp.com>,
perfmon@...ali.hpl.hp.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 13/22] 2.6.22-rc3 perfmon2 : common core functions
Andi,
On Thu, May 31, 2007 at 05:01:38PM +0200, Andi Kleen wrote:
> > + * pmu_desc: subdir containing the PMU register mapping information
> > +
> > + * reset_stats(W): echo 0 > reset_stats resets the statistics collected by perfmon2.
> > + stats are available per-cpu in /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu*/perfmon
> > +
> > + * smpl_buffer_mem_cur(RO): reports the amount of memory currently dedicated to sampling
> > + buffers by the kernel.
> > +
> > + * smpl_buffer_mem_max(RW): maximum amount of memory usable for sampling buffers.
> > + -1 means all that is available.
>
> -1 seems dangerous.
>
> > +
> > + * sys_group(RW): which users group is allowed to create a system-wide contexts.
> > + -1 means any group
>
> Wouldn't this better be a capability bit? Then it could be just set
> in the normal pam configuration files.
>
> > +
> > + * sys_sessions_count(RO): number of loaded system-wide contexts
> > +
> > + * task_group(RW): which users group is allowed to create per-thread contexts.
> > + -1 means any group
>
I spent quite some time looking at the kernel code for capabilities and also how to
control them from userland. I agree with you that it would be nicer to use capabilities
to control which users can create system-wide or per-thread perfmon sessions. We could
simply create two new capabilities: CAP_PERFMON_SYS and CAP_PERFMON_THREAD. Then,
I can envision a setup where a sysadmin would grant the capabilities to users when they login
via PAM.
There are two problems with this at the moment:
- the 32bit for capabilities have been exhausted (kernel_cap_t is u32). We would
need to increase to u64. That would impact __user_cap_data_struct which is used
by the captset()/capget() syscalls.
- I have not been able to find how one could grant/deny capabilities via PAM and
especially for login. Libcap does not seem to be used. There was a pam_cap at
some point, it seems abandonned by now. I am not a linux security
expert, so there may be newer ways of setting capabilities for processes.
Any comments?
--
-Stephane
-
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
Powered by blists - more mailing lists