linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH] Protection for exploiting null dereference using mmap

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Message-ID: <20070605225302.GE3723@sequoia.sous-sol.org>
Date:	Tue, 5 Jun 2007 15:53:03 -0700
From:	Chris Wright <chrisw@...s-sol.org>
To:	Eric Paris <eparis@...hat.com>
Cc:	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, selinux@...ho.nsa.gov,
	Alan Cox <alan@...hat.com>, drepper@...hat.com,
	roland@...hat.com, arjan@...radead.org, mingo@...e.hu,
	viro@...iv.linux.org.uk, jmorris@...ei.org, chrisw@...hat.com,
	sds@...ho.nsa.gov, sgrubb@...hat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH] Protection for exploiting null dereference using mmap

* Eric Paris (eparis@...hat.com) wrote:
> One result of using the dummy hook for non-selinux kernels means that I
> can't leave the generic module stacking code in the SELinux check.  If
> the secondary ops are called they will always deny the operation just
> like in non-selinux systems even if SELinux policy would have allowed
> the action.  This patch may be the first step to removing the arbitrary
> LSM module stacking code from SELinux.  I think history has shown the
> arbitrary module stacking is not a good idea and eventually I want to
> pull out all the secondary calls which aren't used by the capability
> module, so I view this as just the first step along those lines.

Or replace them all with direct library calls to the capability code.
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