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Message-ID: <466AC833.5070306@manicmethod.com>
Date: Sat, 09 Jun 2007 11:33:07 -0400
From: Joshua Brindle <method@...icmethod.com>
To: david@...g.hm
CC: Sean <seanlkml@...patico.ca>, Greg KH <greg@...ah.com>,
Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@...e.de>,
Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>,
Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>, jjohansen@...e.de,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [AppArmor 39/45] AppArmor: Profile loading and manipulation,
pathname matching
david@...g.hm wrote:
> On Sat, 9 Jun 2007, Sean wrote:
> <snip>
>
> what SELinux cannot do is figure out what label to assign a new file.
>
Nit: SELinux figures out what to label new files fine, just not based on
the name. This works in most cases, eg., when user_t creates a file in
/tmp it becomes user_tmp_t, incidentally this is something that AA
cannot handle, if the filenames aren't normalized (they normally
aren't). For example, my ssh agent socket is stored in
/tmp/ssh-XXXXXXXX, where the X's are random characters, AA can't
differentiate admin ssh agents from unprivileged user ssh agents,
showing a serious flaw in their model.
The complaint is that name-based labeling doesn't currently exist (and
as Sean has stated that doesn't mean it _can't_ exist, just that it
doesn't currently). In practice this has not been as big of an issue as
you are making it out to be. Granted restorecond has a tiny race, and I
wouldn't recommend using it on very security sensitive files but for
usability having it relabel user_home_t to user_http_content_t isn't a
problem (and causes no security issues).
-
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