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Message-ID: <20070609210151.GB6663@elf.ucw.cz>
Date: Sat, 9 Jun 2007 23:01:51 +0200
From: Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>
To: Crispin Cowan <crispin@...ell.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
Alan Cox <alan@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk>,
Andi Kleen <andi@...stfloor.org>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: AppArmor FAQ
Hi!
> >> I'm not sure if AppArmor can be made good security for the general case,
> >> but it is a model that works in the limited http environment
> >> (eg .htaccess) and is something people can play with and hack on and may
> >> be possible to configure to be very secure.
> >>
> > Perhaps -- until your httpd is compromised via a buffer overflow or
> > simply misbehaves due to a software or configuration flaw, then the
> > assumptions being made about its use of pathnames and their security
> > properties are out the window.
> >
> How is it that you think a buffer overflow in httpd could allow an
> attacker to break out of an AppArmor profile? This is exactly what
> AppArmor was designed to do, and without specifics, this is just
> FUD.
No, it is not, I already broke AppArmor once, and it took me less then
one hour.
Give me machine with root shell, and make app armor permit everything
but reading /etc/secret.file. AppArmor is not designed for this, but
if you want to claim your solution works, this looks like a nice test.
Actually, give password to everyone, and see who breaks it first.
Pavel
--
(english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek
(cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html
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