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Message-ID: <20070609230239.GA21229@elf.ucw.cz>
Date: Sun, 10 Jun 2007 01:02:39 +0200
From: Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>
To: david@...g.hm
Cc: Crispin Cowan <crispin@...ell.com>,
James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
Alan Cox <alan@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk>,
Andi Kleen <andi@...stfloor.org>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: AppArmor FAQ
Hi!
> >>>>I'm not sure if AppArmor can be made good security for the general case,
> >>>>but it is a model that works in the limited http environment
> >>>>(eg .htaccess) and is something people can play with and hack on and may
> >>>>be possible to configure to be very secure.
> >>>>
> >>>Perhaps -- until your httpd is compromised via a buffer overflow or
> >>>simply misbehaves due to a software or configuration flaw, then the
> >>>assumptions being made about its use of pathnames and their security
> >>>properties are out the window.
> >>>
> >>How is it that you think a buffer overflow in httpd could allow an
> >>attacker to break out of an AppArmor profile? This is exactly what
> >>AppArmor was designed to do, and without specifics, this is just
> >>FUD.
> >
> >No, it is not, I already broke AppArmor once, and it took me less then
> >one hour.
> >
> >Give me machine with root shell, and make app armor permit everything
> >but reading /etc/secret.file. AppArmor is not designed for this, but
> >if you want to claim your solution works, this looks like a nice test.
> >
> >Actually, give password to everyone, and see who breaks it first.
>
> you admit that AA isn't designed for this and then you set this as the
> test, doesn't that seem unreasonable to you?
httpd's run at root priviledge, AFAICT, and Crispin just accused
someone of spreading fud. Exploited httpd is root shell.
Pavel
--
(english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek
(cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html
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