linux-kernel - Re: [AppArmor 39/45] AppArmor: Profile loading and manipulation, pathname matching

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Date:	Sun, 10 Jun 2007 17:17:24 -0400
From:	Joshua Brindle <method@...icmethod.com>
To:	Crispin Cowan <crispin@...ell.com>
CC:	david@...g.hm, Greg KH <greg@...ah.com>,
	Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@...e.de>,
	Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>,
	Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>, jjohansen@...e.de,
	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [AppArmor 39/45] AppArmor: Profile loading and manipulation,
 pathname matching

Crispin Cowan wrote:
> david@...g.hm wrote:
>   
>> On Fri, 8 Jun 2007, Greg KH wrote:
>>     
>>> I still want to see a definition of the AA "model" that we can then use
>>> to try to implement using whatever solution works best.  As that seems
>>> to be missing the current argument of if AA can or can not be
>>> implemented using SELinux or something totally different should be
>>> stopped.
>>>       
>> the way I would describe the difference betwen AA and SELinux is:
>>
>> SELinux is like a default allow IPS system, you have to describe
>> EVERYTHING to the system so that it knows what to allow and what to stop.
>>
>> AA is like a default deny firewall, you describe what you want to
>> happen, and it blocks everything else without you even having to
>> realize that it's there.
>>     
> That's not quite right:
>
>     * SELinux Strict Policy is a default-deny system: it specifies
>       everything that is permitted system wide, and all else is denied.
>     * AA and the SELinux Targeted Policy are hybrid systems:
>           o default-deny within a policy or profile: confined processes
>             are only permitted to do what the policy says, and all else
>             is denied.
>           o default-allow system wide: unconfined processes are allowed
>             to do anything that classic DAC permissions allow.
>   
Still not completely correct, though the targeted policy has an 
unconfined domain (unconfined_t) the policy still has allow rules for 
everything unconfined can do, 2 examples of things unconfined still 
can't do (because they aren't allowed by the targeted policy) is execmem 
and a while back when there was a /proc exploit that required setattr on 
/proc/self/environ; unconfined_t wasn't able to do that either (and 
therefore the exploit didn't work on a targeted system).

That said, the differentiation between strict and targeted is going away 
soon so that one can have some users be unconfined (but still with a few 
restrictions) and others can be fully restricted.

-
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at  http://www.tux.org/lkml/