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Open Source and information security mailing list archives
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Date: Fri, 15 Jun 2007 11:01:18 -0700 (PDT) From: Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com> To: Greg KH <greg@...ah.com>, Crispin Cowan <crispin@...ell.com> Cc: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@...e.de>, Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>, Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>, jjohansen@...e.de, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org Subject: Re: [AppArmor 39/45] AppArmor: Profile loading and manipulation, pathname matching --- Greg KH <greg@...ah.com> wrote: > A daemon using inotify can "instantly"[1] detect this and label the file > properly if it shows up. In our 1995 B1 evaluation of Trusted Irix we were told in no uncertain terms that such a solution was not acceptable under the TCSEC requirements. Detection and relabel on an unlocked object creates an obvious window for exploitation. We were told that such a scheme would be considered a design flaw. I understand that some of the Common Criteria labs are less aggressive regarding chasing down these issues than the NCSC teams were. It might not prevent an evaluation from completing today. It is still hard to explain why it's ok to have a file that's labeled incorrectly _even briefly_. It is the systems job to ensure that that does not happen. Casey Schaufler casey@...aufler-ca.com - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
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