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Message-ID: <20070615211414.GC7337@kroah.com>
Date: Fri, 15 Jun 2007 14:14:14 -0700
From: Greg KH <greg@...ah.com>
To: Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>,
Crispin Cowan <crispin@...ell.com>,
Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@...e.de>,
Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>, jjohansen@...e.de,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [AppArmor 39/45] AppArmor: Profile loading and manipulation,
pathname matching
On Fri, Jun 15, 2007 at 01:43:31PM -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>
> Yup, I see that once you accept the notion that it is OK for a
> file to be misslabeled for a bit and that having a fixxerupperd
> is sufficient it all falls out.
>
> My point is that there is a segment of the security community
> that had not found this acceptable, even under the conditions
> outlined. If it meets your needs, I say run with it.
If that segment feels that way, then I imagine AA would not meet their
requirements today due to file handles and other ways of passing around
open files, right?
So, would SELinux today (without this AA-like daemon) fit the
requirements of this segment?
thanks,
greg k-h
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