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Message-ID: <20070621172344.GQ12950@stusta.de>
Date: Thu, 21 Jun 2007 19:23:44 +0200
From: Adrian Bunk <bunk@...sta.de>
To: Alexander Wuerstlein <arw@....name>
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] signed binaries support [0/4]
On Thu, Jun 21, 2007 at 06:29:17PM +0200, Alexander Wuerstlein wrote:
> On 070621 18:19, Adrian Bunk <bunk@...sta.de> wrote:
> > On Thu, Jun 21, 2007 at 05:55:16PM +0200, Johannes Schlumberger wrote:
> >
> > > Hi,
> >
> > Hi Johannes,
> >
> > > We (two students of CS) built a system for signing binaries and verifying them
> > > before executing. Our main focus was to implement a way to inhibit execution
> > > of suid-binaries, which are not trustworthy (i.e. not signed).
> > >...
> >
> > doesn't anyone who is able to install a not trustworthy suid-binary
> > already have the priviliges to do anything he wants to without requiring
> > an suid bit?
>
> Yes, quite correct in most cases. But if you have taken control of a computer
> on of the more common ways to keep the control for some time is the
> installation of a suid-binary (e.g. as part of a rootkit).
There are so many ways for manipulating a computer that controlling
setuid binaries hardly brings a real security gain.
> One could also imagine a scenario where an attacker controls some filesystems
> (on external storage perhaps) where he can of course manipulate the suid bit,
> but he does not have direct control over the attacked system unless he can
> execute that file.
And unless the filesystem is mounted without nosuid...
> Ciao,
>
> Alexander Wuerstlein.
cu
Adrian
--
"Is there not promise of rain?" Ling Tan asked suddenly out
of the darkness. There had been need of rain for many days.
"Only a promise," Lao Er said.
Pearl S. Buck - Dragon Seed
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